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Overview 
About 1.4 million Australian homes have installed solar panels on 
their roofs since 2001. It is the largest take-up of photovoltaic (PV) 
solar systems of any country. These home owners wanted to save 
money, depend less on the electricity grid, and play their part in 
tackling climate change. But lavish government subsidies plus the 
structure of electricity network tariffs means that the cost of solar 
PV take-up has outweighed the benefits by almost $10 billion.  
By the time the subsidies finally run out, households and 
businesses that have not installed solar PV will have spent more 
than $14 billion subsidising households that have. Australia could 
have reduced emissions for much less money. Governments have 
created a policy mess that should never be repeated. 
Even after the closing of the feed-in tariff programs that comprised 
a large part of the subsidies to solar PV owners, installing a solar 
PV system today makes financial sense in all capital cities except 
Melbourne. That will change if tariffs that better reflect the cost of 
running the network come into force. These tariffs, which federal 
and state ministers have agreed to introduce, will remove a 
second subsidy to solar PV owners. In all states, it will no longer 
be profitable to put panels on the roof. 
But that will soon change. The falling cost of solar coupled with 
progress in battery storage technology will transform the century-
old, centralised grid. Households will have a renewed incentive to 
install solar. They will store the electricity they generate during the 
day and use it in the evening when electricity costs are high. But 
governments must drive the tariff reform to ensure that this new 
model of distributed power generation is both effective and fair. 
As home batteries becomes widely available, consumers will be 
able to use the grid less at peak times, reducing load on the 
network and the need for costly new infrastructure. But the 
widespread view that people will disconnect from the grid in large 
numbers is almost certainly incorrect. Both the cost of the battery 
and the size of the PV system required to maintain a reliable 
power source will deter nearly all urban households from going 
off-grid. The death spiral, the end of the network through falling 
customer numbers, will not occur.  
Nevertheless, the new world of distributed power will profoundly 
challenge the business models of generators, grid operators and 
retailers. In rural areas, individuals, clusters of houses and even 
small towns may find it economically viable to disconnect from the 
grid. In cities, consumers will draw down less power as they 
generate and store their own.  
Policy reform is urgently needed to support these changes. The 
regulation of networks must be tightened so that consumers do 
not pay for more surplus infrastructure. Even with these reforms, 
falling power use is likely to make some existing infrastructure 
redundant. Governments must decide now who will pay for these 
expensive asset write-downs when they are needed.  
The journey to a new model of electricity delivery has begun. 
Already it has seen big mistakes and much waste. If we manage 
the transformation poorly, consumers will pay again. If we do it 
well, everyone can benefit from a more efficient, sustainable and 
affordable electricity system. Solar power in Australia will finally 
find its place in the sun.
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1 From the grid to distributed generation
For a century, Australia’s electricity system has been built around 
generation from a central source. Almost all our electricity comes 
from coal, natural gas and water. Typically, large-scale power 
plants produce electricity at or near the sources of coal, gas and 
water then dispatch it to consumers through the electricity grid. 
But new technologies profoundly challenge this model. 
Photovoltaic (PV) solar, wind and biomass use fuel sources that 
are abundant in most locations, and can generate power at a 
much smaller scale than large, centralised generators. In many 
cases it makes sense for these technologies to generate 
electricity at or near the place where the power will be consumed. 
This is called distributed generation, and one form of it, solar PV, 
has emerged most strongly in Australia.  
Solar PV for households has been supported by generous 
subsidies and incentives from state and federal governments. 
Nearly 1.4 million households now have solar PV panels on their 
rooftops, a higher proportion of all households than any country in 
the world.1 Households that have always been consumers of 
electricity are becoming prosumers — someone who produces as 
well as consumes — and are changing their relationship with the 
grid. Households with solar PV still use the grid to access 
electricity when their solar panels aren’t producing, but they also 
use it to sell any excess energy they produce. 
This report focuses on the emergence of small-scale solar PV, the 
most common form of distributed generation. It examines the 
1 Mountain and Szuster (2014) 
benefits and costs that have accompanied its emergence and how 
these are changing with developments in technologies, tariffs and 
subsidies. Finally, it recommends changes to policies and 
regulations to address barriers to the adoption of distributed 
generation where it is an economically efficient alternative to the 
traditional grid. 
1.1 What is the grid and who pays for it? 
Getting electricity to the user involves three stages: generation, 
transmission, and distribution. The latter two are usually known as 
the network or grid. The high-voltage transmission network 
transports electricity from centrally located power stations to local 
substations. The low-voltage distribution networks transport this 
electricity into homes and businesses. Figure 1 shows the system 
of electricity and who pays for it. 
Grattan Institute 2015 5 
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Figure 1: How electricity and payments flow through the power 
system 
 
Source: Grattan Institute 
Transmission and distribution networks carry power through the 
National Electricity Market (NEM) to more than 9.5 million 
households and businesses in eastern Australia. A separate grid, 
the South West Interconnected Network, services consumers in 
southern Western Australia.  
1.2 Regulated networks and the problem of peak demand 
Transmission and distribution businesses are natural monopolies. 
To prevent them using their monopoly power to drive up prices, 
independent regulators — the Australian Energy Regulator (AER) 
in the NEM and the Economic Regulation Authority (ERA) in 
Western Australia — decide the prices they can charge.  
Every five years each network business presents the regulator 
with a proposal for how much revenue it requires to invest in, 
build, operate and maintain infrastructure. These costs depend on 
the size of the network, and the size of the network depends on 
forecasts of peak demand.  
Peak demand is the amount of power used at the point in time 
that puts maximum load on the network. This point is usually near 
the end of a hot day in summer in all states except Tasmania 
(where it is in winter). Although it only occurs during a very brief 
period, peak demand is vital to network businesses. If they do not 
meet it their network is likely to fail, causing blackouts and huge 
damage to their reputations.  
When peak demand is forecast to increase, network businesses 
traditionally respond by investing in new infrastructure to make the 
grid bigger. Under the regulated monopoly model of electricity the 
businesses are entitled to a return on their investments for the 
lifetime of the assets, which is generally several decades, and 
they pass on these costs to consumers in charges. That is why 
these forecasts of peak demand are so important. If they are too 
high, the result will be unnecessary investments, an overpriced 
network and unduly high power bills. This is what has happened 
in Australia over the past decade.  
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1.3 Falling consumption and peak demand encourage 
alternatives 
Historically, peak demand and total electricity consumption grew 
at similar rates, but since 2000, changes in the way we use 
electricity drove peak demand to grow faster than total 
consumption for several years, as Figure 2 shows.  
Since 2008, total consumption stopped growing and has declined 
steadily in New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland and South 
Australia. It is back to 2000 levels in all states, apart from 
Queensland. While peak demand continued to rise as overall 
consumption declined, more recently it has also fallen, although it 
is still well above 2000 levels. 
More efficient appliances, steep price increases and the impact of 
high exchange rates on manufacturing have all helped to reduce 
electricity use. The adoption of solar PV has also reduced 
consumption of electricity from the traditional, centralised system. 
These factors help to reduce peak demand as well. 
Unfortunately neither the industry nor the regulator anticipated 
these falls in total consumption and peak demand. As a result, 
many of the networks are bigger than we need and cost more 
than they should. 
In a competitive market, falling consumption usually forces 
suppliers to lower their prices. But as regulated monopolies, 
network businesses are entitled to a fixed return on their 
investments. It may be low, but in exchange the network 
businesses do not bear the cost of falling consumption. Instead, 
they simply put up prices to get their return. 
Figure 2: Peak demand has grown faster than total demand 
Index of peak demand and total consumption for electricity by state 
100 = year 2000 
Note: peak demand measured as a 3-year moving average to reduce volatility in the 
measure. 
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These changes have substantially increased the average price of 
each kilowatt hour of electricity. In Queensland, for instance, 
increased infrastructure investment combined with falling 
consumption has been the primary cause of an 86 per cent rise in 
retail electricity prices in real terms since 2007.2 Rising electricity 
prices encourage consumers to look for ways to reduce their 
reliance on grid-provided electricity. One of the solutions they 
have turned to is solar PV.  
1.4 The rise of distributed generation 
Unlike centralised, large-scale power stations that transmit 
electricity to the end user over large distances, distributed 
generation comes in smaller units installed at or near the place 
where the power is used. The users vary from individual homes or 
businesses to entire communities that may have no connection to 
the centralised system. 
 
In Australia, distributed generation has traditionally meant the use 
of diesel generators to power remote homes and communities, or 
as a back-up source of power for businesses in grid-connected 
areas. In the past 20 years it has become increasingly common to 
combine diesel generators with solar PV, leading to cleaner and 
usually cheaper electricity. More than a third of detached and 
semi-detached houses in remote areas have installed solar 
panels, sometimes combining them with lead-acid batteries to 
create their primary power source and turn the diesel generator 
into a back-up for periods of low sunshine and high usage. 
2 ABS (2014). Recent price determinations by the AER have lowered the rates of 
return network businesses receive on their investments, which should see 
reductions in network charges for consumers. 
But in the past decade, most distributed generation is found in 
built-up areas, and the most common form of it is solar PV. 
1.5 Germany, China and the falling price of solar 
Germany has invested heavily in solar PV. It has about the same 
number of systems as Australia (1.4 million at the end of 2014), 
yet its population is almost four times as large.3 But because 
Germany subsidised commercial and large-scale installations as 
well as households, more than 85 per cent of Germany’s solar PV 
capacity comes from systems larger than 10 kilowatts.4 By 
contrast, more than 90 per cent of Australia’s capacity comes 
from small residential systems, of less than five-kilowatt capacity.5 
At the end of 2013, Germany accounted for more than 25 per cent 
of the world’s total installed capacity of solar PV. Australia 
accounted for only 2.3 per cent, reflecting our relatively small 
population and low investment in commercial and large-scale 
solar PV systems, as Figure 3 shows. 
3 Fraunhofer ISE (2015) 
4 Ibid. 
5 CCA (2012) 
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Figure 3: Australia accounts for a relatively low proportion of global 
solar PV capacity 
Cumulative installed global solar PV capacity, gigawatts  
 
Source: BP (2014) 
Germany has been responsible for much of the fall in the global 
price of the technology. As early as 1991, it provided feed-in tariffs 
for renewable energy, while the 100,000 homes scheme, 
launched in 2000, provided loans to homeowners and businesses 
to help them install solar PV. For a short time, strong demand led 
to Germany becoming the world’s leading installer and 
manufacturer of solar PV. German demand also encouraged 
manufacturing of solar PV in other countries, especially China, 
which has been able to significantly reduce manufacturing costs. 
China’s increased share of the manufacturing market is due to 
lower wages and high domestic and global demand. China also 
provided substantial subsidies for manufacturers of solar PV, 
which subsequently led to anti-dumping action by several 
countries, including the U.S. It now has the second largest 
installed capacity of solar PV behind Germany, and accounts for 
more than half of solar PV manufacturing in the world.6 
As China brought down manufacturing costs, the price per watt of 
installed residential systems in Australia fell rapidly between 2008 
and 2013, falling from about $12 per watt to under $3 per watt.7 
The next chapter examines the other reason why so much solar 
power was installed in Australia during this period.  
 
6 Earth Policy Institute (2013) 
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2 Solar PV: a good deal for some, a high price for all 
Commonwealth and state government policies have encouraged 
huge household take-up of solar PV, provided a big boost to the 
renewable energy industry and helped to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions.8 Yet the results have come at a high cost. Certificate 
schemes and feed-in tariffs, along with poorly structured network 
tariffs, have provided $14 billion worth of subsidies to solar PV 
owners that all other power users have had to pay for. This 
chapter examines these subsidies and their effects on the 
electricity system.  
2.1 Subsidy one: certificate schemes and feed-in tariffs 
Certificate schemes and feed-in tariffs pay a direct subsidy to 
households to encourage them to install solar PV. From 2010 the 
Federal Government has encouraged households to install solar 
PV through the Small-scale Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES), 
as Box 1 describes. Between 2008 and 2011 state governments 
supported solar PV through highly generous premium feed-in 
tariffs. The combination of these subsidies and the falling price of 
the technology saw a solar PV boom between 2010 and 2012, as 
Figure 4 shows. 
8 These objectives are set out in legislation in the Renewable Energy (Electricity) 
Act 2000, see Australian Government (2000). 
Figure 4: Subsidies drove rapid growth in solar PV installations 
Number of small-scale solar PV installations, thousands 
 
Note: ‘Other’ includes Tas., ACT, and NT. 
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Box 1: SRES, child of the Renewable Energy Target  
In 2001, the Commonwealth Government introduced the 
Mandatory Renewable Energy Target (MRET) to increase the 
amount of electricity generated from renewables by 9,500 gigawatt 
hours per year by 2010. In 2009 the scheme was replaced by the 
Renewable Energy Target (RET). Now at least 20 per cent of 
electricity generation would come from renewable sources by 
2020.  
To provide certainty to the market, the target was expressed as a 
total of 45,000 gigawatt hours of electricity to be generated from 
renewable sources by 2020. At the same time, the Government 
introduced an additional incentive, under which a 1.5 kilowatt solar 
PV system would receive a subsidy that was five times that for 
other forms of renewable energy. As a result, installations of solar 
PV were much higher than expected, and this caused the market 
price of Renewable Energy Certificates to crash from well over $40 
to below $30 (this is the subsidy available for each megawatt hour 
of renewable energy produced). An effect of this lower price was to 
discourage investment in large-scale projects. 
 
 
A year later, the scheme was split in two. The large-scale RET was 
given a target of 41,000 gigawatt hours of electricity produced from 
large-scale renewable electricity generation and the Small-scale 
Renewable Energy Scheme (SRES) a target of 4000 gigawatt hours 
from small-scale systems. Unlike the large-scale target, the SRES 
target is not fixed. In 2013 solar PV produced 6400 gigawatt hours of 
energy, far exceeding the initial target.9 It is expected to produce 
11,000 gigawatt hours in 2020.10 
The SRES trades in certificates. When consumers put a solar PV 
system (or a solar hot water system or heat pump) on their roof, they 
receive one Small-scale Technology Certificate (STC) for every 
megawatt-hour of electricity they are forecast to generate over a 15-
year period (the forecast depends on the system’s size and location, 
since some places get more sun). Owners sell the certificates to offset 
the upfront cost of the system. 
Normally the system installer sells the certificates to an energy 
retailer, either directly or through a clearing house, on behalf of the 
owner. In return the installer gives the owner a discounted price on 
the PV or solar hot water system. Electricity retailers have an 
obligation under the SRES to buy STCs, and pass the cost on to 
consumers’ energy bills. 
9 Warburton, et al. (2014) 
10 CCA (2012) 
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Feed-in tariffs pay households for the electricity their PV solar 
system generates and exports to the grid. The premium tariffs 
offered during the boom days of 2008 to 2011 mean that for 15 
years, eligible Victorian households receive a minimum of 60 
cents for every kilowatt hour they export to the grid, more than 
four times the typical retail tariff in 2009. Until 2028, Queensland 
and South Australian households will receive at least 44 cents per 
kilowatt hour. In NSW, the 60 cent feed-in tariff is only contracted 
for seven years, but households are paid for all the electricity they 
produce, and are able to purchase additional electricity from the 
grid at a much lower rate.  
Households responded enthusiastically to the tariffs and took up 
solar PV at a rate much faster than state governments had 
anticipated and budgeted for. Alarmed, most states responded by 
lowering the tariff for new households. Tariffs went from 
“premium” to “transitional”.11 Eventually, all states closed the 
schemes. Four — New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, 
and Western Australia — removed the tariff in 2011 and early 
2012 and installations fell sharply in 2012 and 2013. Queensland 
kept premium tariffs until mid-2013, and installations grew by 
more than 35 per cent in 2012, but have more than halved since 
the tariffs were removed. Nationally, the number of systems 
installed in 2014 was less than half the number installed in 2011.12 
Feed-in tariffs also created an employment bubble. When the 
incentives were wound back, it burst. The number of people 
employed in the rooftop solar industry in the 2013-14 financial 
11 Transitional feed-in tariffs were typically one-for-one: households received the 
retail electricity tariff for every kWh exported. 
12 CER (2015). 
year was just over half that of two years earlier.13  
The story was similar with an earlier PV support program, the 
Solar Photovoltaic Rebate Program. It led to a six-fold increase in 
PV generation capacity in the 2000s, but it had the same boom-
and-bust characteristics as feed-in tariffs. It also subsidised solar 
PV owners at the expense of everyone else and had little benefit 
as an industry assistance measure.14 
Households who install solar PV today receive a feed-in tariff that 
more closely reflects the average wholesale price of electricity — 
typically between six and eight cents a kilowatt hour.  
Yet premium tariffs continue to be paid to households who 
installed solar PV before the schemes were closed. Because 
network businesses are allowed to recover the costs of these 
subsidies from their customer base, subsidies paid to one group 
of consumers must be funded by another. In other words, 
households with feed-in tariffs are being subsidised by everyone 
else. 
The schemes in Queensland and South Australia were particularly 
attractive and remained open for the longest time. More than 40 
per cent of owner-occupied houses have installed solar PV in 
those states, as Figure 5 shows. In Western Australia the 
penetration rate has been helped by high levels of sunshine, while 
consumers in rural and regional Victoria and New South Wales 
have made high savings because their retail power prices are 
high. 
13 ABS (2015) 
14 Macintosh and Wilkinson (2010) 
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Figure 5: Solar PV is most common in states that had the most 
generous feed-in tariffs 
Rooftop solar PV penetration rates, percentage of owner-occupied 
houses, Feb 2015 
 
Note: includes detached and semi-detached houses. 
Source: Grattan analysis of CER (2015), ABS (2011) 
2.2 Subsidy two: network tariffs that do not properly reflect 
costs 
A second subsidy associated with solar PV is related to how 
electricity is priced. Peak demand determines the cost of the 
network, which in turn determines the amount of our power bills. 
Yet the cost of meeting peak demand has no effect on the bills of 
households and small businesses, which are typically charged the 
same or a similar amount for each kilowatt hour of electricity, 
regardless of when it is consumed. 
Under the current volumetric tariffs, households who do not use 
much electricity overall but use a lot during peak periods when the 
strain on the network is high, are being subsidised by other 
households. Owners of air-conditioners, for example, generally 
consume large amounts of electricity during peak times and, as a 
result, are being cross-subsidised by other electricity users. 
Solar households are in a similar position. Since they consume 
less electricity overall, they pay less than other households do to 
use the network. But because peak use of the residential network 
usually occurs in the early evening when there is little or no solar 
output, solar households on average place as much strain on the 
distribution network as those without solar PV do.  
Figure 6 shows that a typical Melbourne household demands the 
most energy at around 7pm, but a north-facing solar PV system 
stops producing energy at about 6.30pm. In other words, most 
solar households require just as much network infrastructure as 
everyone else but are paying less. All consumers are subsidising 







NSW Vic. Qld SA WA Tas. ACT
Capital city
Rest of state
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Figure 6: Household consumption is typically highest when solar 
output is low 
Average power consumption and 3-kilowatt solar PV output, typical 
Melbourne household, kilowatts 
 
Note: solar PV system is north-facing with a 30 degree tilt and an average efficiency of 80 
per cent. The y-axis measures household’s average demand or solar production at a point 
in time (measured in kilowatts), while the shaded areas represent the average amount of 
energy consumed or produced across the day (measured in kilowatt hours). 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
ABS (2012). 
Cost-reflective tariffs greatly reduce these cross-subsidies by 
making the price for consuming electricity during peak periods 
greater and reducing prices at other times. They also encourage 
households to spread their electricity consumption more evenly 
across the day, placing less strain on the network, and thereby 
delaying or avoiding the need for infrastructure upgrades. Their 
introduction would not change the total revenue paid to network 
businesses but in the long term consumers will benefit through 
lower electricity prices. 
Grattan’s 2014 report, Fair pricing for power, proposed a new 
design of network tariffs in order to reduce cross-subsidies among 
consumers, and to create incentives for consumers to reduce the 
load they place on the network.15 The report proposed the 
introduction of a demand charge which reflected the maximum 
load that households place on the network during peak times. 
In November, 2014, the Australian Energy Market Commission 
(AEMC), the rule maker for electricity and gas markets, issued a 
determination that requires distribution network businesses to 
develop by 2017 electricity pricing that better reflects the cost of 
building the network16. If proper cost reflective tariffs are 
introduced, households will pay directly for the amount of network 
infrastructure they use — especially at peak times when the 
network is under greatest strain and is most expensive to run — 
while paying less for the overall amount of electricity they 
consume. Under this reform, households with solar PV would pay 
more to use the network than they do today. 
15 Wood, et al. (2014) 
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2.3 Subsidies are expensive and inefficient 
The widespread adoption of solar PV has brought economic 
benefits and costs.17 Switching from centralised electricity 
generation, mainly from fossil fuels, to distributed, solar PV 
generation brings two main benefits. First, solar PV has reduced 
the amount of electricity that needs to be produced. This 
represents a benefit of $7 billion of avoided generation costs. 
Second, electricity generated from solar PV will reduce emissions 
by an estimated 66 million tonnes of CO2 by 2030 — or about four 
million tonnes a year. Installed solar PV will achieve less than 10 
per cent of the abatement required to achieve Australia’s 2020 
emissions target over the next five years.18 
If those emissions are priced at $30 a tonne, the reduction 
represents a benefit to society of about $2 billion. Once the 
electricity savings are added in, the total benefit is just over $9 
billion. 
But purchasing, installing and maintaining the solar PV systems 
until 2030 will cost $18.7 million, outweighing the benefits by more 
than double. The net economic cost is $9.7 billion, as shown in 
Figure 7. 
17 We have analysed the aggregated costs and benefits to society from nearly 
1.4 million solar PV systems installed since 2009. Some costs and benefits have 
already occurred, others are projected until 2030. See Sundown, Sunrise: 
Technical Appendices for details. 
18 Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM 
(2015), ABS (2012), AEMO (2015b). 
Figure 7: Rooftop solar PV has come at a large cost to society 
Aggregate net present benefits and costs to society of solar PV systems 
installed from 2009, $2015 
 
Note: includes all costs and benefits from 2009 to 2030. Does not include solar PV 
systems yet to be installed. 
Source: Grattan analysis of CER (2015), BOM (2015), Solar Choice (2015), APVI (2014), 
AEMO (2015b), ABS (2014), IPART (2012), ESC (2014), QCA (2013), ESCOSA 
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In calculating the net benefits and costs of solar PV, our analysis 
estimates that the economic cost of the emissions reductions to 
2030 due to solar PV is more than $175 a tonne. By contrast, the 
Commonwealth Government’s recent auction under the 
Emissions Reduction Fund purchased emissions reduction at an 
average price of $13.95 a tonne. The Warburton review of the 
RET calculated that the cost of emissions reduction under the 
Large-scale Renewable Energy Target was $32 a tonne.19 
2.4 Solar PV may bring additional benefits to electricity 
consumers 
2.4.1 The merit order effect 
Households with solar PV may help to reduce wholesale 
generation prices through what is known as the “merit order 
effect”. It takes its name from the way in which the NEM operates. 
Generators bid at five-minute intervals to dispatch electricity to the 
grid. Those who have submitted the lowest bids get to dispatch 
their electricity before higher cost generators, until the total 
amount of electricity dispatched equals demand during that five-
minute period. All generators are paid the price bid by the last 
accepted generator.20 
The generation of electricity by solar PV installed on household 
and business roofs reduces the amount of electricity demanded 
from the wholesale electricity market. This means that the last 
accepted generator will now be lower cost than previously, 
19 Warburton, et al. (2014). This is the value if emissions are not discounted in 
the future. Even under the discounted value, emissions reductions cost $62 a 
tonne.  
20 AER (2014) 
thereby reducing the price received by all generators and lowering 
the price for consumers. 
Some industry analysts have used the merit order effect to justify 
premium feed-in tariffs.21 Yet merit order effects can occur in other 
ways that do not lead to financial reward. When a household 
reduces its electricity consumption by installing more efficient 
appliances, or when a new electricity generator enters the 
wholesale market, both reduce wholesale prices for everyone.22 
But neither party receives compensation and they do not expect it.  
Lowering wholesale prices does not constitute a net economic 
benefit to society, which is why it does not appear in the cost-
benefit analysis presented on page 15. Instead, it is a short-term 
financial transfer from existing generators to electricity retailers, 
who may then pass these savings onto consumers. In economic 
terms, society as a whole does not benefit. 
2.4.2 Impact on network peaks 
Lowering peak demand may delay the need for future investment 
to expand and upgrade the network, reducing costs for 
consumers. Solar PV may impact peak demand in some areas, 
but the overall impact is likely to be small, even though solar has 
reduced overall electricity consumption. 
Any benefit of solar PV on the distribution network will depend on 
how it affects peak demand at the feeder or substation level of the 
network. Across an entire network, peak demand typically begins 
21 See, for instance McConnell, et al. (2013). 
22 IPART (2012) 
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in the late afternoon, when solar PV systems are still producing 
some electricity. But electricity generated by solar PV does not 
necessarily align with peak periods at the feeder or substation 
level, particularly in residential areas where peaks occur later. 
Figure 8 shows that an increasing penetration of solar PV can 
have a large effect on electricity demand during the day without 
impacting on the peak at the feeder level of a residential area. 
On the other hand, peak demand in the transmission network 
tends to occur in the afternoon, driven primarily by commercial 
and industrial users.23 Solar PV in residential areas can potentially 
reduce these peaks, since it is still producing in the afternoon. 
Solar PV can also have a negative impact on the network. The 
variation in the amount of electricity produced by a solar PV unit 
over the course of a day can be dramatic. Sudden cloud cover 
can abruptly reduce or increase solar production, leading to a 
surge or sudden drop in household demand for electricity. These 
changes in the flow of electricity along the grid can put stress on 
the network, potentially forcing network businesses to invest more 
to maintain reliability. 
It is difficult to quantify the value of the delayed investment and 
additional operating costs caused by installed solar PV for the 
transmission and distribution network. What matters is that in the 
future all customers, including solar PV owners, face price signals 
to use the network efficiently so they are rewarded fairly when 
they do. 
23 Moyse (2014) 
Figure 8: A high penetration of solar does not necessarily reduce 
network peaks 
Electrical current flowing through a Queensland feeder in a residential 
area with increasing rooftop solar penetration, amps 
Note: recorded on second Tuesday in October of each year. 
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2.5 Subsidies are a $14 billion wealth transfer 
The SRES and premium feed-in tariff schemes created $10.4 
billion worth of cross-subsidies that flow from electricity users 
without solar PV to those with solar PV, as Figure 9 shows. The 
second subsidy — unintentionally embedded in the structure of 
electricity network tariffs — benefits solar PV owners to the tune 
of $3.7 billion. As a result of these two cross-subsidies, by 2030 
consumers without solar PV will pay consumers with solar PV a 
total of $14 billion. 
The subsidies are particularly unfair when many renters, 
apartment dwellers and low-income households are unable to 
gain the benefits of solar PV. 
State governments did not foresee the rapid take-up of solar PV 
these incentives would create and the costs that followed. They 
did not implement mechanisms to prevent the costs getting out of 
control. By the time governments closed the schemes, the 
damage had been done. The mistakes must not be repeated.  
Fortunately, these issues are starting to be resolved. Premium 
feed-in tariff schemes are closed to new households and the 
SRES is due to start winding down in 2017. These changes are 
likely to reduce the yearly savings going to households with solar 
PV. Chapter 3 examines a tariff reform that could make electricity 
tariffs more efficient and fair, and make solar power more 
expensive in the short term but more cost-effective in the long run. 
Figure 9: Consumers without solar have paid a lot towards those 
with solar 
Aggregate net cross-subsidies from electricity consumers without solar 
PV to consumers with solar PV, $2015 
 
Note: cross-subsidies do not include those from consumers with solar PV to other 
consumers with solar PV. Includes all cross-subsidies between 2009 and 2030. 
Source: Grattan analysis of CER (2015), Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), 
BOM (2015), ABS (2012), Energy Australia (2015), Origin Energy (2015), AGL (2015), 
ABS (2014), ABS (2011), IPART (2012), ESC (2014), QCA (2013), ESCOSA (2014), 
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3 The economics of solar PV are changing 
This chapter examines whether it is financially worthwhile to install 
household PV systems given their current purchase prices, 
electricity tariffs and subsidies. It also considers how the move to 
cost-reflective electricity prices will change the economics of solar 
PV, both for households that have already installed it and for 
those considering it.24 The modelling is outlined in Box 2. 
3.1 Under current tariff settings, solar PV is still a good 
investment 
A household that installs solar PV today avoids the cost of 
electricity consumed when solar panels are producing — between 
20 and 35 cents a kilowatt hour in most parts of Australia. If the 
panels produce more electricity than the household consumes, it 
earns a feed-in tariff of between six and eight cents a kilowatt 
hour for the energy exported. 
Depending on their location, different households face different 
costs and benefits for installing solar PV. What may be 
economically viable for one may be prohibitively expensive for 
another. Different electricity tariffs are charged in different states 
and the states have varying levels of sunlight. People at home 
during the day are likely to consume more electricity when solar 
panels are producing, whereas households with people working 
by day and coming home at night are likely to export most of their 
solar energy. 
24 While the financial viability of solar PV is an important determinant of whether 
a household chooses to install a system on their roof, households may also have 
other motivations for doing so, such as environmental concerns. 
Box 2: An economic model of solar PV 
We analysed household consumption data measured at half-
hourly intervals, and weather data including solar radiation in 
order to simulate household consumption over 15 years. The 
following results consider the costs and benefits to a household 
installing a three-kilowatt solar PV system today.25 Households 
are assumed to have sourced a competitively priced solar PV 
system and retail electricity offer. 
The financial viability of installing a solar PV system in each city is 
determined by the economic concept of ‘net present value’ (NPV), 
which takes into account both current and future payments. 
Because people value a sum of money today more than they 
would in a year’s time, future costs and payments are discounted 
at a rate of 5 per cent per year (in real terms). The NPV accounts 
for all costs and payments over a 15-year period, reflecting that 
most households would expect a payback within this timeframe. 
The model assumes that a household is able to install a solar PV 
system in the optimal position and maintain it over 15 years.  
See Sundown, sunrise: Technical Appendices for details. 
 
25 The average system size installed since 2014 is 4.4kW, but 3kW is the most 
commonly installed system size since 2014. For the average households, the 
optimal system size is between 2kW and 3kW. 
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Figure 10: Investing in solar PV provides a positive return in nearly 
all major cities 
Net present value of investing in three-kilowatt solar PV system for a 
typical household 
 
Note: solar PV system is north-facing with a 30 degree tilt and an average efficiency of 80 
per cent. NPV calculated using a 5 per cent real discount rate over 15 years. Electricity 
tariffs assumed to rise by one per cent each year in real terms, with no carbon price. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
ABS (2012), Solar Choice (2015), Energy Australia (2015), Origin Energy (2015), AGL 
(2015). 
Figure 10 shows that the net present value of installing a three-
kilowatt solar PV system is positive for a typical household in each 
capital city — except for Melbourne. This is partly because of the 
low level of sunlight experienced in Victoria compared to 
Queensland, for example. It is also because Victorian consumers 
have lower levels of electricity consumption than in other states 
due to the amount of gas that is used. The less electricity 
consumed, the less benefit to be gained from displacing grid 
produced electricity with solar PV generation.  
Figure 11 shows the costs and benefits for a typical Sydney 
household with a solar PV system over 15 years, receiving a feed 
in tariff of 6.6 cents per kilowatt hour.26 We calculated the benefits 
as lower bills through reduced electricity usage, income from 
energy exported to the grid, and the SRES subsidy. In the 
absence of a price on carbon, the SRES subsidy provides an 
incentive to households to reduce emissions.   
The costs include the total cost of the system (panels, inverter, 
balance of system costs and installation), and system 
maintenance (cleaning panels, repairs and inverter replacement 
cost after 10 years). Over the 15 years, the household came out 
ahead by $612, in 2015 dollars. 
 
26 Results for all cities are shown in Appendix A: Economics of solar PV, 
extended results (page 55) 








Net cost Net benefit
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Figure 11: Solar PV benefits households most by reducing their 
electricity usage 
Net present benefits and costs of installing a three-kilowatt solar PV 
system, typical Sydney household, in 2015 dollars 
Note: system maintenance costs include inverter replacement after ten years. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
ABS (2012), Solar Choice (2015), Energy Australia (2015), Origin Energy (2015), AGL 
(2015). 
 
3.2 A new tariff structure will make solar less attractive 
Under current electricity pricing and with the SRES subsidy still 
available, solar PV remains an attractive investment for most 
households. But recently announced reforms to the regulatory 
framework for networks will change the way we pay for electricity. 
Provided they are properly designed, more cost-reflective tariffs 
will greatly reduce cross-subsidies among electricity consumers. 
They will also change the economics of the household decision to 
install solar PV  
The AEMC has announced that it will require network businesses 
to implement cost-reflective network tariffs. But the structure of 
these tariffs is not yet clear. If they are well designed, they will 
contain a tariff based not on a household’s overall electricity use 
but on its maximum demand for power at a point in time.27 This 
demand tariff would better reflect the load a household puts on 
the network and therefore the cost to the network. By creating an 
incentive for households to use the network more efficiently, a 
demand tariff would delay the need for future upgrades to and 
investment in network infrastructure.  
27 This is sometimes referred to as a capacity charge. But there is another 
definition of capacity charge, where a consumer pays for a maximum level of 
capacity to be delivered to their premises, which they cannot exceed. We do not 
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The new tariffs may also include a critical peak tariff that would 
apply only at times and in places where the network is expected 
to be under strain. This tariff would be high, creating a further 
incentive for households in these areas to use less power at peak 
demand times, again reducing strain on the network. In return, 
these customers would be charged a lower price at other times.28 
The following analysis examines the economics of solar PV when 
a household pays to use the network through a demand tariff. We 
have assumed a tariff that is broadly consistent with initial 
proposals put forward by network businesses.  
The demand tariff is charged monthly. A higher tariff applies in 
summer to reflect the fact that peak demand is more likely to 
occur at this time.29 The charge is meant to reflect how much a 
household uses the existing network, and to encourage it to 
spread electricity consumption over the course of 24 hours and 
reduce demand at peak times. Not only does this delay the need 
for future investment, it is also a much fairer way for households 
to pay for the amount of network they use. Any household that 
can reduce its maximum monthly peak by an average of one 
kilowatt could save more than $100 a year on its electricity bill.30 
28 See Wood, et al. (2014) for a detailed description of cost-reflective pricing. 
29 Hobart is the exception, where peak demand is more likely to occur in winter. 
The demand charge is adjusted to reflect this. A minimum monthly demand 
charge applies so that all households contribute to the existing network. 
30 This is based on a demand charge of $15 a kilowatt for each of the summer 
months (December through to March), and $6 a kilowatt for all other months. 
However, the change to a demand tariff would reduce the savings 
of households with solar PV. It would not affect their earnings 
from selling energy to the grid. But when the network charge is 
based on a household’s maximum demand, households with solar 
PV pay a similar amount to other households. As a result, solar 
PV households in most cities would lose more than $200 a year in 
savings. 
This loss of savings greatly affects whether solar PV is a 
worthwhile investment. Figure 12 shows that under a demand 
tariff, a three-kilowatt solar PV system is no longer beneficial in 
any of the capital cities. The price of the system would need to fall 
by $500 in Adelaide, $600 in Perth and $800 in Brisbane before a 
household is able to break even. 
Figure 13 shows that a typical Brisbane household with solar PV 
saves almost $5700 on their electricity usage under the current 
tariff but would save just over $3000 under a demand tariff.31 The 
difference represents the loss of the cross-subsidy that 
households with solar PV would receive from non-solar 
households over 15 years. 
 
31 Results for all cities are shown in Appendix A: Economics of solar PV, 
extended results (page 55). 
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Figure 12: Investing in solar PV is not financially attractive under a 
demand tariff 
Net present value of investing in three-kilowatt solar PV system for a 
typical household under a demand tariff 
 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
ABS (2012), Solar Choice (2015), Energy Australia (2015), Origin Energy (2015), AGL 
(2015). 
Figure 13: A demand tariff reduces the savings from reducing 
electricity usage 
Net present benefits and costs of installing a three-kilowatt solar PV 
system under a demand tariff, typical Brisbane household, $2015 
 
Note: system maintenance costs include inverter replacement after ten years. Transparent 
bars highlight the changes arising from the shift to a demand tariff from the current tariff. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
ABS (2012), Solar Choice (2015), Energy Australia (2015), Origin Energy (2015), AGL 
(2015). 
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3.3 Genuine cost-reflective tariffs are essential 
The move to more cost-reflective tariffs by 2017 is important to 
reduce unfair cross-subsidies among electricity consumers. But 
there is no guarantee that the change will be properly 
implemented. Because demand tariffs create some losers, they 
will face some opposition. State or territory governments may 
intervene so that watered down versions lessen the impacts on 
consumers but fail to significantly reduce the cross-subsidies. 
They should resist this temptation by making three key reforms: 
3.3.1 Implement demand tariffs effectively 
Effective implementation of demand tariffs faces a number of 
challenges. First, there is a trade-off between giving consumers 
an accurate price signal and protecting them from sudden 
increases in prices. The structure of demand tariffs already 
announced suggests that network businesses are favouring the 
latter approach. For instance, basing the demand tariff on a 
consumer’s maximum demand each month gives a relatively 
weak price signal to customers.  
For the tariff to give a strong and accurate price signal, the time 
when it is applied should coincide as closely as possible with 
periods of peak demand during summer months (in all states 
except Tasmania). A monthly demand charge has only a weak 
connection to these peaks, which reduces its ability to create 
more efficient use of the network.  
Second, if the implementation of demand tariffs is voluntary, those 
who benefit from the current tariff structure, including those with 
solar PV, are unlikely to opt in. Demand tariffs would then only 
remove cross-subsidies among consumers over a long period of 
time, as consumers respond to rising volumetric tariffs by 
switching to demand tariffs. If cost-reflective pricing is to be 
voluntary initially, it should be made mandatory by 2020. This will 
be essential for demand tariffs to work in the long run. 
Third, the absence of smart meters or interval meters for many 
households outside Victoria makes the broad take-up of demand 
tariffs more difficult. A roll-out of either interval meters or smart 
meters will be needed. In the interim, more cost-reflective tariffs 
could still apply where customers do not have more advanced 
meters. Instead of charging customers on their individual 
maximum demand, customers could be charged according to the 
maximum demand in the area in which they live. Consumers with 
relatively flat consumption would have an incentive to install a 
smart meter and this would lead to a price reduction for them. 
3.3.2 Introduce critical peak pricing 
Demand tariffs are not perfect in reflecting the costs imposed on 
the network, but they will be a significant improvement over 
current tariff structures. In areas where the network is already 
under pressure, the Australian Energy Regulator should require 
network businesses to implement a tariff structure known as 
critical peak pricing as an alternative to building new 
infrastructure.  
Under a critical peak price, consumers are told in advance of a 
pending critical peak period, during which they will be charged 
between three and eight times the standard flat-rate tariff.32 These 
32 Wood, et al. (2014) 
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consumers will pay a lower price at other times. There is evidence 
this approach can significantly reduce peak demand, with savings 
for all.33 
An alternative that consumers might find more palatable would be 
for network businesses to offer critical peak rebates to some 
customers in areas where the network is constrained. Under this 
approach, households would be paid to keep their power use 
below a certain level during times when peak demand is likely to 
occur. 
3.3.3 Introduce cost-reflective feed-in tariffs 
When solar PV owners export energy to the grid, they are paid a 
fixed feed-in tariff that is meant to reflect the average wholesale 
price of the electricity that is not generated as a result. But cost-
reflective pricing for electricity consumed should be balanced with 
cost-reflective pricing for energy exported. This would further 
encourage households with solar PV to reduce the strain they 
place on the network. 
33 Faruqui and Sergici (2009), Ito, et al. (2015) 
One approach would be to have two feed-in tariffs applying at 
different times. The first would apply for most of the year and 
reflect the average wholesale price of electricity across this time. 
The second would be set at a much higher rate, and apply either 
when wholesale prices are very high, or when the network is 
under strain.34 
At most times, solar households are better off consuming power 
from their panels rather than exporting. But at peak times, a high 
feed-in tariff would encourage these households to consume less 
and export more energy. In response, they may choose to install 
west-facing panels, since the output is likely to better align with 
peak periods. This feed-in tariff structure would lower the 
wholesale price of electricity in the short-term, and take the 
pressure off the network in the long-term by reducing the need for 
upgrades.
34 To be effective at changing behaviour, solar households would need to be 
informed whenever the higher feed-in tariff is in place. 
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4 Why battery storage changes everything 
The introduction of demand tariffs will not make solar PV 
economically unviable forever. Its cost is coming down all the 
time. In a few years further reductions will make it economically 
viable again, at least in some Australian cities. In this next stage, 
solar PV for households and businesses can substantially reduce 
the need for power from traditional, centralised generation and 
reduce emissions levels at a cost that does not disadvantage 
other consumers. But the change requires one more element to 
be complete: the advent of affordable battery storage.  
While falling consumption will hurt the wholesale market and 
returns to generators, its impact on network businesses is likely to 
be limited, at least for a while. Battery storage has the potential to 
change that, yet not in the way many anticipate. People will still 
need the grid and the “death spiral” that many electricity analysts 
fear is unlikely to occur.35 But use of the grid in new ways will 
raise profound questions about how the grid should be paid for.  
4.1 Further reductions in the costs of installing solar PV 
will make it economic 
Under a demand tariff, a three-kilowatt solar PV system is not 
economically feasible in the capital cities. But only a small 
reduction in the cost of solar PV systems is required to make it 
viable in Adelaide, Perth and Brisbane, as Figure 14 shows. 
35 This idea describes what could happen if some consumers decide to 
disconnect from the grid. The costs are spread across those who remain, which 
makes leaving the grid more and more attractive until only those with no capacity 
to leave the grid are left to pay for the lot. 
Figure 14: Solar PV only requires a small reduction in cost to break-
even in some cities 
Net present value of installing a 3 kilowatt solar PV system for a typical 
household under a demand tariff, $2015 
Note: percentages shown on chart refer to break-even points. Solar PV system cost refers 
to total installed cost (before SRES subsidy), not a household’s out-of-pocket expenses. 
However, the results assume the SRES remains in place. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
ABS (2012), Solar Choice (2015), Energy Australia (2015), Origin Energy (2015), AGL 
(2015), IEA (2014). 
Such reductions in price could occur very soon. The International 
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25 per cent by 2020.36 If that is correct, solar PV will be 
economically viable by 2020 for households in Adelaide, Perth, 
Brisbane and Sydney, even after demand tariffs are introduced in 
2017. Solar PV costs will need to come down by about a third for 
it to be economically viable in Melbourne and Hobart, which is 
forecast to occur before 2030.37 
As solar PV prices fall, within a few years more households will 
choose to adopt solar PV without the need for subsidies. Yet 
many households will still be unable to. Renters and apartment 
owners have limited scope to adopt solar PV. For low-income 
households the upfront costs of solar PV are prohibitive. It is 
important to unwind cross-subsidies to ensure that these 
consumers don’t end up paying increasingly high costs. 
As the cost of solar PV falls, more businesses are likely to install 
systems. The limited uptake in the commercial sector to date has 
partly been because the incentives for solar PV have been 
skewed towards households and not businesses.38 Cost-reflective 
tariffs were introduced for many businesses some years ago, 
which reduce the financial attractiveness of solar PV to them. 
Falling costs will change this. But the cost of solar PV is not the 
only factor that will affect its uptake in the future. 
Given the current trends of falling consumption, the wholesale 
electricity market is likely to be over-supplied for almost a decade 
or more, keeping wholesale prices lower.39 The AER’s decision in 
36 IEA (2014) 
37 Ibid. 
38 AER (2014) 
39 AEMO (2014a) 
April 2015 to reduce the regulated returns to network businesses, 
if upheld, will reduce the delivered price of electricity. In addition, 
the SRES is due to start winding down from 2017, with no 
alternative carbon price in sight. These factors will reduce the 
savings available to solar PV from reducing electricity 
consumption from the grid. 
4.2 Solar PV on its own will not greatly reduce peak 
demand 
Solar PV will continue to reduce demand for electricity generated 
from centralised sources and delivered through the grid. Yet 
because use of solar PV does not usually coincide with periods of 
peak demand, it will not necessarily reduce the size of the grid we 
need. 
Some analysts maintain that solar households would be better off 
facing their panels west in order to maximise their output during 
peak times and thereby help to reduce peak demand. But there is 
a trade-off to doing this, as the solar PV system will produce less 
power overall, and consumers will have to buy more power from 
the grid. Whether or not this is cost-effective will vary with 
individual circumstances and location. 
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At present, the impact of solar PV on peak demand and network 
capacity is limited. Figure 15 shows the impact of solar PV on two 
substations in South-East Queensland. An electricity network is 
comprised of numerous substations servicing different zones. 
Substations servicing residential zones typically have a higher 
prevalence of solar PV than substations in commercial zones. But 
commercial peaks tend to occur in the middle of the afternoon, 
while residential peaks occur in the evening. 
While the story is not exactly the same for every residential and 
commercial substation, Figure 15 shows that even a low 
prevalence of solar PV in a commercial zone can reduce the 
peak, whereas a high prevalence of solar PV in a residential zone 
may not reduce the peak at all. 
Residential solar forms the bulk of Australia’s solar PV capacity. If 
more solar capacity is used in the way it has always been used, 
demand will hollow out in the middle of the day, and solar will 
have little impact on reducing the need for a large grid. The 
wholesale electricity market will need to cope with the reduction in 
overall consumption of electricity, but the network will not be 
significantly affected. 
Figure 15: Solar PV output is poorly aligned with residential peaks 
Substation load, 15 January 2015, megawatts 
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4.3 Demand tariffs create an incentive for battery storage 
All this will change with the introduction of battery technology. The 
ability to store energy generated at one time for use at a later time 
will transform the electricity system. Solar PV will interact with 
centralised generation and the network in a new way. At present, 
solar PV’s ability to compete with centralised forms of generation 
is limited in two ways: it is not flexible in terms of when it produces 
energy, and its output is highly variable across days. Energy 
storage greatly reduces these limitations. 
Yet the change will not unfold in the way that many people have 
predicted. Battery storage has long been cited as the technology 
breakthrough that will allow customers to end their relationship 
with the grid.40 The combination of solar PV and a home battery 
has already allowed some households to disconnect from the grid, 
or to not connect in the first place. These households usually have 
a back-up source of power such as a diesel generator. But this 
opportunity is unlikely to be available to urban dwellers. Instead, 
the introduction of demand tariffs combined with affordable home 
batteries will offer them a different opportunity to change their 
relationship with the grid.  
A battery can be combined with solar PV to keep a household’s 
maximum demand low, reducing its impact on network peaks. But 
under current tariffs, the incentives to do this are weak. A demand 
tariff will encourage households to store some energy in a battery 
and consume it in peak periods to avoid the high price. The 
battery can be charged on the grid overnight when electricity is 
cheaper, or by using excess solar output. By using a battery to 
40 See, for instance, Citi Research (2014) 
keep their maximum demand low, households with solar PV will 
still able to export their excess solar energy. 
A household with a three-kilowatt solar PV system already 
installed will save an additional $300 to $400 a year on their 
electricity bill if they install a seven-kilowatt-hour battery under a 
demand tariff. This is about $100 more a year than the same 
household would save under the current tariff structure. 
But the news is even better than that. Because a household 
usually only has a high demand for electricity over a brief period, 
not every day, batteries would not need to be used as often. 
Because battery life depends greatly on the number of times it is 
charged and discharged (and the depth to which it is discharged), 
a battery used efficiently under a demand tariff could last for up to 
twice as long as one used daily under the current tariff structure. 
Figure 16 considers the price to install a battery at which a 
household with solar PV will break even for each capital city. 
Under current tariffs, a seven-kilowatt-hour battery installed for 
$2000 is only financially viable in Adelaide, but a price of $2400 is 
viable in every city under demand tariffs. In Brisbane and 
Adelaide, the battery is economically viable at a price of $3100 
under demand tariffs. This assumes that the battery will last for 10 
years when charged and discharged daily under current tariffs, 
but for 15 years when used efficiently under demand tariffs. 
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Figure 16: Battery storage will become economically viable sooner 
under a demand tariff 
Break-even installed price of a seven-kilowatt-hour battery for a typical 
household with three-kilowatts of solar PV, $2015 
Note: these results assume that households receive the standard feed-in tariff, not a 
premium feed-in tariff. Results are based on a lithium-ion battery with a depth of discharge 
of 80 per cent, and an average efficiency of 85 per cent. The battery is used efficiently 
under a demand tariff to minimise a household’s demand. Includes maintenance costs of 
$10 per kilowatt hour per year. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
ABS (2012), Energy Australia (2015), Origin Energy (2015), AGL (2015). 
Tesla Motors have announced a home battery, the Tesla 
Powerwall, likely to be released in Australia in the next couple of 
years. The seven-kilowatt hour lithium-ion battery to be released 
in the US is priced at $US3000 (plus balance-of-system costs 
such as the inverter and charger).41 Accounting for these 
additional costs, the exchange rate, GST and installation costs, an 
Australian household would have to pay at least $7000 to install 
one of these batteries in 2017 — not an economically viable 
decision. 
Assuming that the cost of installation is about $1000, battery 
storage could be economically viable for the average household 
at a cost of about $250 a kilowatt hour. Citigroup predicts that a 
cost of $US230 a kilowatt hour is possible by 2022 (including 
balance of system costs), with further price reductions to follow.42 
These results suggest that tariff reform will be vital to the uptake 
of battery storage in Australia. 
Some households with solar panels will purchase batteries even if 
the financial costs outweigh the benefits. Some will want to be 
early adopters of a new technology, others will value the 
environmental benefits. Some will want to sever their connection 
with the electricity grid so they can be self-sufficient. But a large-
scale rollout of battery storage is unlikely without the technology 
being financially viable for most households. 
There is a further barrier to the take-up of storage. The premium 
feed-in tariff schemes have years to run, some to as late as 2028. 
Households that installed solar PV under those schemes will 
make more money exporting their excess solar energy to the grid 
than storing it for later consumption. 
41 Tesla Motors (2015) 
42 Citi Research (2014). At current exchange rates, $US230 corresponds roughly 
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Of course, it is not only households with solar PV installed who 
may benefit from a home battery. Households without solar may 
be able to use a small battery to manage their demand. They can 
charge their battery overnight using cheap electricity from the grid, 
and use the energy stored to reduce demand during peak times. 
Under a demand tariff, the decision to install a seven-kilowatt hour 
battery without solar becomes economically feasible at an 
installed price of $2300 in all cities apart from Sydney and 
Melbourne. 
Both solar PV and battery storage can independently save 
households money on their energy bill. But the two technologies 
are complementary — households with both will save more. 
Whether households choose to install one or both technologies 
will depend on how prices change in the future. 
The use of battery storage will reduce peak demand across the 
network. If a large number of households use a home battery to 
manage their demand, network businesses will invest less in new 
and upgraded infrastructure, and all consumers will pay less. 
The development of battery storage also gives households the 
potential to disconnect from the grid. If many do so, other 
consumers would have to pay more to ensure network businesses 
get their fixed rate of return. The more consumers have to pay, 
the more likely they are to leave the network, creating a vicious 
circle that analysts call the “death spiral” — the end of the network 
through declining consumer numbers. But a number of factors 
suggest this danger is not imminent. 
4.4 Going off grid is still far off for urban dwellers 
Many households are excited about the development of battery 
storage, believing it will enable them to disconnect from the grid. 
But without a back-up source of power, a very large financial 
investment is required to have a reliable off-grid system. 
Households in urban areas will be much better off using the grid 
as their back-up source of power instead of a diesel generator. 
An off-grid household loses the financial benefit of being able to 
export electricity to the grid. And because solar output is highly 
variable it cannot reliably generate all of a household’s power, 
particularly on winter days of cloud and weak sunlight. This 
means the battery must be large enough to cover for days of 
heavy cloud. The size of the required battery and solar PV system 
is likely to exceed the dimensions of all but the biggest houses. 
For example, a seven-kilowatt solar PV system — the minimum 
size system needed to go off grid and have reliable access to 
electricity — is likely to require between 60 and 70 square metres 
of roof space. Ideally the panels would face north and be tilted at 
about 60 degrees to maximise output in winter, although east- and 
west-facing roofs can be used if necessary. Many city houses just 
do not have that amount of clear roof space. 
Figure 17 shows that for an upfront cost of about $34,000 a 
typical Sydney household that installs a seven-kilowatt solar PV 
system with 35 kilowatt hours of battery storage (enough backup 
for two days of consumption) would be able to generate 95 per 
Grattan Institute 2015 31 
Sundown, sunrise 
cent of its electricity needs across the year.43 That still means the 
equivalent of 18 days a year with no power.  
To attain 99 per cent reliability, a household would require a 10-
kilowatt solar PV system and 60 kilowatt hours of storage, at an 
upfront cost of about $52,000. This would require even more roof 
space, ruling out even more households. 
Reliability of 99.9 per cent amounts to an average of nine hours a 
year without power, which would be competitive with the grid in 
most urban areas. But this would cost a household more than 
$72,000 with a 15-kilowatt solar PV system and 85 kilowatt hours 
of storage — more than double the cost of achieving 95 per cent 
reliability. For urban residential households, it is not just the cost 
that would be prohibitive but the size of the system as well. Only 
the largest homes would be able to accommodate 15 kilowatts of 
solar panels on their roof space. 
By comparison, the total cost of relying completely on the grid 
(with no solar or storage) for 10 years is about $13,000. This is far 
less than the upfront costs of any of the off-grid options, and is 
rather more reliable.44 
43 This is based on a lithium-ion battery price of $600 per kWh (including balance 
of system costs), plus $5000 installation. This reflects where prices might 
possibly be within the next three years. 
44 Ten years is chosen as a comparison since lithium-ion batteries are likely to 
need replacing at this point. 
Figure 17: Going off the grid requires a substantial initial 
investment and reduced reliability 
Upfront cost of an off-grid system by reliability level versus net present 
cost of remaining connected to the grid, typical Sydney household, 
$2015 
Note: solar PV system is north-facing with a 60 degree tilt and an average efficiency of 80 
per cent, lithium-ion battery assumed to run with a depth of discharge of 80 per cent, and 
an average efficiency of 85 per cent. Maintenance costs of solar PV and batteries are not 
included. Net present cost of remaining connected to the grid is calculated using a 5 per 
cent real discount rate over 10 years. Electricity tariffs assumed to rise by one per cent 
each year, with no carbon price. 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
ABS (2012), Solar Choice (2015), Energy Australia (2015), Origin Energy (2015), AGL 
(2015). 
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Some households may accept less reliability than they have from 
the grid today, but even a few days a year without power can 
create problems. Food that must be refrigerated or frozen may be 
spoiled, electric cooktops, ovens and microwaves cannot be used, 
and there will be difficulties using a home office. Therefore, most 
households would turn to some form of back-up for the times 
when the battery is depleted and the sun is not shining. 
In remote locations that are not connected to the grid, a diesel fuel 
generator is the most common back-up source. Generators are a 
cheaper way to achieve high reliability than installing more solar 
and storage, but they still require further capital investment and 
have a high fuel cost. To purchase and run a generator to meet 
five per cent of a typical Sydney household’s consumption may 
cost more than $10,000 over a 10-year period, on top of the 
$34,000 cost of solar PV and storage. The noise of running a 
diesel generator would prevent their use in most urban areas. And 
diesel generators produce a lot of emissions.  
In cities, it simply makes sense for households to use the grid as 
their back-up source. Tariff reform may mean that households are 
charged more to remain connected to the grid, but much of this 
cost could be recovered by exporting excess energy. A seven-
kilowatt solar PV system might be required to meet a household’s 
consumption in winter, but it produces a lot more energy than a 
household requires in summer when the days are longer and 
there is less cloud cover. For a Sydney household with seven 
kilowatts of solar PV and 35 kilowatt hours of battery storage, the 
net cost of remaining connected to the grid over 10 years is about 
$2500 — far cheaper than running a diesel generator.45 And the 
battery can be charged from the grid, which may be useful during 
periods of low sunlight. 
4.5 Battery storage will transform the electricity sector 
Even without a mass exodus of consumers from the grid, battery 
storage will have profound consequences for the electricity sector. 
The take-up of solar PV has already made an impact on both the 
wholesale market and on networks. The rise of solar PV has been 
one component in reducing electricity consumption and prices in 
the wholesale market over the past six years. Reduced amounts 
of electricity flowing through the grid have driven networks to 
increase unit prices to maintain revenue. 
Under demand tariffs, solar PV will soon become economically 
viable without subsidies, and further installations will increase the 
impact on the wholesale market and the network. When battery 
storage combined with demand tariffs becomes the norm, 
generators and network businesses will have to adapt to a new 
world. 
4.5.1 Impact on the wholesale market 
The large uptake of solar PV is already challenging generators. 
Even though total generation of rooftop solar is only two per cent 
of the electricity produced in the NEM, its high output in the 
middle of the day significantly reduces the demand for electricity 
45 This is based on a demand tariff with a minimum monthly charge. Under 
current tariffs in Sydney, this household can actually make a net gain remaining 
connected to the grid, since export income exceeds the small supply charge. 
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from centralised generators.46 Falling demand and rising 
renewable generation supported by the RET have already forced 
a number of coal-fired generators to be mothballed or run only on 
a seasonal basis.47 Further increases in the uptake of solar PV 
will accelerate such change. More households using solar and 
battery storage to flatten peak demand will reduce the need for 
expensive generation in peak periods. But there are implications 
for baseload generators as well. 
At present, the periods of high-priced electricity generation are an 
important source of revenue for all generators in the NEM. The 
lower price generators receive during non-peak periods is 
normally enough to cover the marginal cost of producing 
electricity from coal or gas-fired baseload generation. The higher 
price at peak times helps all of them to cover the capital costs of 
building the generation. Fewer periods of higher prices could force 
all generators — including those with low or negative marginal 
costs such as wind farms — to bid at higher prices in order to 
recover their capital costs.  
Yet these changes, significant as they will be, do not appear to 
pose any policy or regulatory challenges for governments. Some 
commentators fear that in the long run they could threaten the 
current structure of the wholesale market.48 But many analysts 
believe the NEM will continue to provide reliable and competitive 
power, even though some generators may shut down. While 
industry participants, regulatory agencies and governments will 
46 AER (2014) 
47 Ibid. 
48 Nelson, et al. (2014) 
need to carefully monitor developments, a catastrophe does not 
seem to be imminent. 
4.5.2 Impact on the electricity network 
Grattan’s 2014 report, Fair pricing for power, proposes the 
introduction of demand tariffs across the network to ensure 
customers pay a fair share for the existing grid, and critical peak 
pricing in areas where there is an imminent need for network 
investment.49 
This tariff structure will provide a strong incentive for consumers 
to reduce peak demand, and solar PV with battery storage could 
become a cost-effective way for them to do it. The existing 
network would still need to be paid for, but the high costs of future 
investment could be reduced or avoided. 
Nevertheless, network businesses have big challenges ahead. 
With a home battery, consumers could be a lot more aggressive 
in cutting their peak demand. Using a seven kilowatt hour battery, 
a Brisbane household can cut its average monthly maximum 
demand of six kilowatts by half, saving more than $400 a year on 
its power bill.50 If the take-up of battery storage is high, a 
significant reduction of peak demand could lead to a scenario 
where some network assets are never required.  
If peak demand fell, under current regulations network businesses 
would be entitled to raise tariffs to maintain their revenue. Rising 
49 Wood, et al. (2014) 
50 Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM 
(2015), ABS (2012). This reduction in a household’s maximum monthly demand 
can be achieved regardless of whether the household has solar PV installed. 
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prices could also lead to a different kind of death spiral — caused 
not by households leaving the grid but by households consuming 
less from it. 
Policy makers must face the question of who will pay for the parts 
of the grid that are not needed. Grattan’s 2013 report, Shock to 
the system: dealing with falling electricity demand, identifies the 
following potential solutions:51 
• Existing infrastructure costs could be frozen and paid for 
as a fixed annual fee for each home or business, similar to 
a rates-style system. To prevent the cost of the network 
being spread over a shrinking number of consumers, all 
households would have to pay, even those who 
disconnect from the grid.52 Demand tariffs and critical peak 
pricing would be used to ensure more efficient future 
investment decisions. The renewable energy industry and 
some consumers would strongly resist this approach, 
arguing that it would encourage consumers to stay 
connected to the grid, while unjustifiably propping up an 
outdated business model. But it could be justified on the 
principle that the network was built by the businesses and 
approved by the AER on behalf of all consumers. 
51 Wood, et al. (2013) 
52 Rates-style systems already deliver a number of services. In Victoria, the 
Water Act 1989 authorises water businesses to charge landowners for water 
services if water and sewerage infrastructure is available to their properties, 
regardless of whether they use those services. 
• Using another principle — that network businesses should 
bear the risk of over-valued assets, as power generators 
do — the AER could impose asset write downs in its 
regulatory determinations. Existing regulatory frameworks 
do not envisage this prospect, and investors in network 
businesses are unlikely to have factored this risk into their 
investment decision (although it could be argued that the 
rate of return they have actually received is sufficient to 
cover it).53 Such write-downs could be seen as a sovereign 
risk and deter future investment in Australian 
infrastructure. 
• If neither of the above can be implemented, governments 
may fund an asset write-down and taxpayers would pay 
the cost. 
None of the alternatives is attractive, but the problem must be 
addressed. If it is not, consumers will pay for the underutilised 
assets through ever higher network charges, and consumers 
without distributed generation will pay more for the old grid than 
those with solar PV and batteries. 
 
53 Grattan’s 2012 report, Putting the customer back in front, showed how 
distributors provided higher equity return with lower risk than other equity 
investments, rather than lower returns. See Wood, et al. (2012) 
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5 How distributed generation will transform networks 
Distributed generation gives networks an opportunity to change 
the way their business works — to offer services differently and in 
a more cost effective manner. Opportunities already exist for 
network businesses to adopt distributed generation instead of 
adding to the existing grid. This chapter assesses these 
opportunities and what regulatory barriers must be removed to 
make them a reality. 
5.1 Distributed generation is an alternative to augmenting 
the network 
Traditionally, network services have been delivered to most parts 
of Australia through substations, poles and wires and other 
infrastructure. Network businesses have responded to increases 
in peak demand by augmenting the existing network and investing 
in new infrastructure. 
Distributed generation can offer a low-cost solution to a network 
constraint — the point at which the network infrastructure cannot 
cope with demand for electricity. At peak periods, distributed 
generation can take pressure off the network by supplying 
electricity directly to the grid, rather than having it flow from a 
central source through the constrained piece of infrastructure. 
Box 3 describes the options that a network business has to deal 
with a network constraint. Although some forms of distributed 
generation, such as diesel generators or batteries, can defer the 
need for network investment, they may have shorter lives than 
traditional wires-and-poles solutions. This may actually be an 
advantage as we enter a period of high uncertainty. 
A network can also use distributed generation instead of replacing 
ageing assets, or as a way to defer their replacement by 
alleviating the load on the local network. 
Some network businesses already use distributed generation as 
an alternative to traditional network investment. Some embed 
diesel or gas generators within their networks or use solar or wind 
generation in more remote areas. Box 4 provides an example of 
how a network business uses distributed generation to deal with a 
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Box 3: Options for dealing with network constraints  
The introduction of more cost-reflective pricing will help to alleviate 
pressure on the network. Grattan’s 2014 report Fair pricing for 
power, argues that network businesses should consider critical 
peak pricing as a way to deal with a network constraint. This 
pricing will encourage consumers to reduce their demand at peak 
times, reducing the constraint on networks. The network 
businesses have three other options to address constraints. These 
can work either in conjunction with critical peak pricing or where it 
has not been introduced: 
1.   Traditional network build: the business increases the capacity 
of the existing network by enhancing the infrastructure. This may 
involve either adding infrastructure such as a new line, or 
increasing the capacity of existing infrastructure — by replacing an 
existing substation, for example. When peak demand and total 
consumption in the local area are likely to continue growing, these 
options are likely to be the most cost-effective solution. 
2.   Demand management: instead of increasing the network’s 
capacity, a network business acts to decrease demand during peak 
periods. It might pay customers to reduce their electricity use 
during peak periods, for example. For short periods, this is the 
most cost-effective means of dealing with a constraint. 
 
In the PeakSmart air-conditioning scheme run by Energex in south 
east Queensland, customers are paid an upfront fee of up to $500 to 
connect their air-conditioner to the scheme. During peak periods, 
Energex is able to remotely limit the amount of electricity used by the 
air-conditioners, reducing stress on the network. By the end of March 
2015, more than 26,000 air-conditioners in south east Queensland 
had been connected to the scheme. As part of Energex’s broader 
demand management programme, the PeakSmart program has 
contributed to a reduction of 144 megawatts of electricity demand 
over a five year period. 
3.   Distributed generation solution: a network business can bypass 
the constraint by local installation of a diesel or gas-fired generator. 
The network business can either own the generator themselves, or 
contract an independent company to provide the distributed 
generation solution. 
During a peak period, the generator provides electricity to the area. In 
the future, batteries may prove to be a cost-effective option. Electricity 
could be stored at times of low demand and supplied to the local area 
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Box 4: Traralgon case study 
In 2012, AusNet Services investigated a forecast constraint at its 
zone substation in Traralgon, Victoria, which supplies more than 
16,000 customers in central Gippsland. Increases in peak 
demand put pressure on the three transformers at the substation, 
potentially leading to a loss of power for some households in 
Traralgon and surrounding areas. 
A typical network response to this constraint would be to replace 
and upgrade two of the transformers at the substation. Instead, 
AusNet Services replaced just one transformer and commissioned 
a third party, NovaPower, to supply up to 10 megawatts of power 
from its Traralgon Power Station, situated downstream from the 
substation, at times when the network is constrained.  
The $11million, 10 megawatt gas-fired power station operates as 
an independent generator, selling electricity into the NEM. The 
contract with AusNet Services guarantees that the power station 
will fire-up during the periods of the constraint reducing pressure 
on the substation. 
This reduces the risk of power outages for local consumers and 
deferred the need to spend $2.9 million on upgrading a second 
transformer at the substation. 
Yet these types of example remain the exception. Current 
regulations do not consistently provide incentives to deliver the 
most cost-effective outcome. 
5.2 Why networks are not using distributed generation 
The main regulatory tool the AER has at its disposal to encourage 
network businesses to use distributed generation are the 
Regulatory Investment Tests for transmission and distribution 
(RIT-T and RIT-D). The tests require network businesses to 
consider non-network solutions (as in Box 3) as an alternative to 
investment in poles and wires.  
This chapter examines the RIT-D process and the incentives and 
barriers that exist to assist or prevent distribution businesses from 
using distributed generation. For transmission businesses, the 
size of upgrades limits the use of non-network solutions, although 
distributed generation can still play a role.  
When a distribution business identifies a need to enhance the 
capacity of the network and the cost exceeds $5 million, it is 
required to undertake a RIT-D assessment.54 Third parties may be 
invited to submit proposals to deliver a non-network solution. If the 
solution is technically viable and offers the greatest economic 
benefit, then the distribution business must adopt it.  
At present, network businesses use surprisingly little distributed 
generation, even with the RIT-D process. 
54 In Western Australia, distribution businesses are required to undertake the 
Regulatory Test, which is their version of the RIT-D. However, the Regulatory 
Test only applies to any proposed augmentation that costs at least $11.7 million.  
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The 11 distribution businesses in the NEM have identified only 37 
projects as suitable for the RIT-D process over the next five years. 
Some of these depend on new housing developments or other 
demand growth, while others may not pass the RIT-D test. 
Part of the reason for the small number of potential projects may 
lie in limitations with the RIT-D. We examine these here: 
5.2.1 There are no specific enforcement provisions 
The rules governing the RIT-D process may not be sufficient to 
force distribution businesses to consider non-network options. 
Initially the COAG Energy Council proposed that the AER would 
have specific review and audit powers to determine whether (a) 
network businesses were adequately considering non-network 
options and (b) were considering all projects above the $5 million 
threshold. These provisions were not adopted because in its final 
ruling the AEMC decided that the AER’s existing powers were 
adequate.55 
As a result, while all businesses are required to undertake a RIT-
D in the above circumstances, there is no process beyond the 
existing compliance regime to ensure that it happens. The RIT-D 
replaced the old regulatory test at the beginning of 2014 and how 
much the AER is able to ensure compliance with these 
regulations is yet to be determined. If, over the next regulatory 
period, it becomes apparent that network businesses are not 
adhering to the RIT-D process, the COAG Energy Council should 
consider the introduction of the specific review and audit powers 
that it initially proposed.  
55 AEMC (2012) 
5.2.2 The investment test does not apply to replacement 
spending 
The RIT-D process only applies to projects that augment the 
network and not to the replacement of existing infrastructure, 
unless that replacement adds capacity to the grid.  
Yet the investments network businesses make to replace existing 
assets are a significant part of their capital expenditure. On the 
basis of current AER revenue determinations, network businesses 
in New South Wales, Queensland and South Australia are 
forecast to spend about 37 per cent of their capital on replacing 
assets, as shown in Figure 18. 
As the cost of distributed generation reduces and battery storage 
and other technologies develop, these non-network solutions are 
increasingly likely to be a cost-effective alternative to replacement 
spend.  
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Figure 18: Replacing existing infrastructure forms a large part of 
capital expenditure 
Replacement capital expenditure relative to total capital expenditure 
Note: The information reflects the final AER decisions relating to Ausgrid, Endeavour and 
Essential, and the AER’s preliminary decisions regarding Energex, Ergon and SA Power 
Networks. 
Source: Grattan analysis of AER (2015a), AER (2015b), AER (2015e), AER (2015c), AER 
(2015d), AER (2015f). 
Given the amount spent on it, and the increasing potential of 
distributed generation, the RIT-D test should be imposed on 
replacement expenditure. The AER have recently identified this 
gap and have suggested that the AEMC consider applying the 
RIT-D (and RIT-T) to replacement spend.56 
5.2.3 Networks are still encouraged to spend on 
infrastructure 
The regulatory process has flaws that continue to encourage 
distribution businesses to over-invest in the network.57 Grattan’s 
2012 report, Putting the customer back in front, shows that the 
more a business invests in capital expenditure, the greater the 
return.  
Every five years the AER determines a network business’s total 
revenue for the next five-year period. It also determines the 
network business’s rate of return — the yearly return it gets on the 
amount of money it has invested in its infrastructure.  
The rate of return that a network business receives has been 
keenly debated in recent years. If it is too high, as many 
independent analysts believe, it provides a strong incentive to 
network businesses to build infrastructure of questionable need.58 
New South Wales network businesses were allowed a rate of 
return of over 10 per cent in the previous regulatory 
determination, and spent the money on major capital investments. 
The businesses are not solely to blame: unduly high reliability 
standards imposed by the New South Wales Government forced 
them to spend significantly on capital.  
56 AER (2015g) 
57 Wood, et al. (2012) 
58 Mountain (2015) 
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Since 2012 and the release of Putting the customer back in front, 
the regulatory framework that governs distribution businesses has 
changed significantly. The AER’s Better Regulation reform 
program has improved the incentive for network businesses to 
save on their capital expenditure. For any saving on capital 
expenditure during the five-year regulatory determination, the 
business gets to keep 30 per cent of that saving. 
The outcomes of the last round of regulatory determinations also 
suggest that the AER is addressing the problem. Capital spending 
for all New South Wales network businesses that have been 
assessed has been downgraded by about 20 per cent on 
average. The rate of return has also been reduced from about 10 
to 7 per cent. 
These changes are encouraging. The incentive for businesses to 
gold plate the network is much reduced. Yet the overall regulation 
process may still encourage businesses to favour building new 
infrastructure over lower-cost alternatives. Whether the recent 
changes to the regulatory framework and the actions of the AER 
will be enough to counteract this remains to be seen. 
5.3 The regulatory framework needs to change 
Providing network businesses with the right incentives to deliver 
the lowest cost options is difficult. Consumers expect networks to 
be safe and deliver electricity when they need it, but they also 
want it done at least cost and do not want to pay for infrastructure 
they do not need.  
Recent changes have done much to reduce the incentives for 
network businesses to over-invest in network infrastructure. Two 
adjustments to the regulatory framework will improve this further 
and should reduce the likelihood of future over-investment.  
5.3.1 Annual adjustments of consumption forecasts 
The level of capital spending is determined at the beginning of the 
regulatory period and is set for a five-year period. A network 
business’s proposed capital expenditure will depend on forecasts 
for electricity consumption and peak demand over the future 
period. As shown in Figure 19, over the last 10 years, these 
forecasts have become increasingly inaccurate and usually too 
high. This led to regular downward adjustments. 
The current regulatory model includes some incentive for the 
network business not to proceed with unnecessary capital 
expenditure. If the business chooses not to spend capital included 
in the original forecast, it still collects revenue as though the 
investment had been made. But this is allowed only for the five 
year regulatory period and at a reduced level into the next five-
year period. 
Despite this approach, the business still has a strong incentive to 
argue for excessively high capital forecasts. There is a better way. 
Setting capital expenditure based on the best available five-year 
forecast but then reviewing it annually would allow capital 
spending to reflect the most up-to-date forecasts, such as those 
published by the Australian Electricity Market Operator (AEMO). 
Revenue requirements and network prices would then be 
adjusted according to the new forecast level of spending. 
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Figure 19: Consumption forecasts can adjust substantially in a year 
National Electricity Market residential and commercial energy 
consumption, forecast versus actual, terawatt hours 
 
Note: one terawatt hour is equal to one billion kilowatt hours. 
Source: AEMO (2013), AEMO (2014b) 
Network businesses may complain about the increased 
administrative burden, yet the businesses already produce yearly 
electricity demand forecasts in order to complete their annual 
planning reports. Businesses operating in competitive markets 
routinely use a similar process in their internal capital 
management processes. 
5.3.2 Formalise asset write-downs in the regulatory 
framework 
At present, the AER can undertake a limited review of capital 
spending when a network business spends more than the AER 
has approved for a five-year period. If the AER finds that the 
capital spending was not prudent, it can prevent the business 
from recovering the cost of some of their infrastructure through 
the network charges. The AER reviews the prudency of the capital 
spend as a whole, yet only capital expenditure that exceeds the 
allowance can be excluded from the Regulated Asset Base 
(RAB). 
This is a new rule and has yet to be tested. But it should be 
extended to allowing the exclusion of any capital expenditure the 
AER deems not to be prudent, not just the value of the excess 
expenditure. Such a change would effectively embed a process 
for future asset write-downs in the five-year regulatory process. 
As part of the determination, network businesses should be asked 
explicitly to demonstrate prudent capital expenditure during the 
previous five-year period. The AER will need to form a view on 
whether this spending has been prudent. If it has, it can be rolled 
into the asset base. If it hasn’t — either because infrastructure 
has been built where there is no need or because a business has 
implemented one solution where a more cost effective, non-
network one was available — the AER should have the authority 
to reduce the base. Such post-expenditure capital expenditure 
reviews are a common practice in competitive markets. 
Western Australia’s New Facilities Investment Test (NFIT) 
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which capital spent on major augmentations can be recovered 
through network tariffs. The Economic Regulation Authority can 
exclude from the RAB any investment that does not satisfy the 
test. A result of Western Power’s first Access Arrangement 
(Western Australia’s version of a regulatory determination), was 
the write-down of around $220 million worth of assets as a result 
of the NFIT.  
This approach increases the financial risk to the network 
business, bringing it close to that faced by a non-regulated 
business. The rate of return to the network business may need to 
be adjusted to reflect this risk.  
These changes may still not get the incentives absolutely right; 
however, they will be a move in the right direction. For example, 
the threat of an asset write-down may be sufficient to encourage 
the businesses to spend more prudently.    
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6 Where going off-grid makes sense 
The emergence of distributed generation challenges the 100 year-
old model of the grid as a natural monopoly. Genuine competition 
in how network services are provided is in sight. Although going 
off-grid is still not economically viable in cities and may not be for 
a very long time (see Chapter 4), it does make sense for some 
households and communities, and the numbers of these will 
steadily increase. 
At present, there are powerful barriers to going off-grid. Under 
current regulations, network businesses struggle to offer off-grid 
solutions and there is no process to allow third parties to compete 
to deliver these services. Policy makers need to address these 
problems now to ensure that solutions exist when going off the 
grid becomes the most economically efficient way to access 
electricity. 
6.1 Going off-grid in remote areas can make sense 
In some rural and remote areas, an off-grid, distributed generation 
solution makes sense today. Box 5 describes an example and 





Box 5: Case study: Gascoyne Junction, Western Australia 
Horizon Power is a government-owned, vertically integrated 
electricity supplier to 45,000 consumers in 45 communities in 
regional and remote Western Australia. Gascoyne Junction is a 
town of 44 households approximately 175km from Carnarvon.  
Electricity is produced by four 80 kilowatt diesel generators owned 
by an independent company that has a supply contract with 
Horizon Power. Horizon buys electricity and sells it to the houses 
via a local network at a flat rate of 22 cents per kilowatt hour. The 
revenue from this tariff does not cover the cost of supply, and 
another government-owned business, Western Power, pays 
Horizon Power a subsidy to cover the gap. Effectively urban 
consumers pay the subsidy for regional and remote consumers. 
In Gascoyne Junction, three houses have installed five kilowatts 
each of solar PV, contributing to meet a demand that averages 
around 90 kilowatts, with a summer peak of 250 kilowatts. 
It is likely that some combination of more solar PV, either on roofs 
or as a small solar farm could be combined with battery storage 
and a much smaller diesel generator as a cheaper solution in the 
future. A decision point could be on expiry of the current contract 
with the generator. 
The critical regulatory question is whether the current policy and 
regulations will allow Horizon Power to implement such a lowest 
cost solution. The fact that Horizon Power is an integrated 
supplier makes things simpler, but the combination of a low, fixed 
tariff and a subsidy do not necessarily provide an incentive for the 
lowest cost solution. 
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6.1.1 …for customers who are not connected to the network 
The population density of urban areas keeps network costs 
relatively low. The cost of connecting an additional household to 
the grid may be only the cost of running a wire to the property, 
probably a few hundred dollars. 
But because remote areas may not have a nearby network, 
connecting to the nearest grid will require investment in new 
network infrastructure, which consumers must wholly or partly pay 
for. The amount they will contribute will depend on the nature of 
the network upgrade. 
There are two types of costs networks face when connecting a 
new customer to the grid in remote areas. The first is the physical 
cost of connecting the property to the network and may involve 
investment in new poles and wires (shallow augmentation). The 
second is the cost of any upgrade to the network, such as an 
upgrade to a substation, necessary to support the addition of a 
further property (deep augmentation). A customer connecting to 
the grid will be expected to pay the network business the full cost 
of any shallow augmentation, but not the deep augmentation 
costs, which are paid for by the network business’s broader 
customer base.  
Where shallow augmentation costs are the only costs the network 
faces in order to connect the customer, the decision to go off-grid 
rests mainly with the consumer as they have a choice either to 
pay for the grid connection, or to buy an off-grid solution. 
Alternatively, the network may require deep augmentation to 
connect a customer. In this case, the customer wishing to connect 
their property to the network does not face the full cost of 
connection. The result is that they may choose to connect to the 
grid, when from an economic perspective it would have been 
cheaper to have them choose an off-grid solution. The extent to 
which the decisions made by individual customers deliver the 
most cost-effective solution is not straightforward, as illustrated in 
Box 6. 
Much will depend on whether further growth on the network is 
likely. If the network business anticipates that more customers will 
connect to the local network in the future, it should either 
undertake the deep network augmentation, or implement a non-
network solution — whichever is lowest cost when anticipated 
growth is included. If such growth is not expected, the network 
businesses should be able to offer the customer a distributed 
generation solution. Yet ring-fencing arrangements in the 
regulations, explained later in this section, which prevent network 
businesses from operating as anything other than a network 
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Box 6: Off-grid scenarios in remote areas can be complex 
Customers in remote areas are, in many cases, supplied through 
Single Wire Earth Return (SWER) lines. There are about 28,000 
kilometres of SWER lines in Victoria and 65,000 in regional 
Queensland.59 The cost of these SWER lines is estimated to be 
$50,500 per kilometre.60  
Imagine a customer who wants to connect a new property to the 
nearest network supply point, two kilometres away. If only the cost 
of the line is taken into account, the cost of connection is 
$101,000 for a line with a typical life of 30 years. The cost of 
providing an off-grid solution, featuring solar panels, a battery and 
back-up generator for that period is $80,000, including 
maintenance and replacement costs. 
The cost-effective solution for the customer would be to install 
distributed generation. Yet if another customer builds a property 
next to the first customer and makes the same decision, together 
they would have spent $160,000 to go off-grid, well in excess of 
the network solution. 
If both customers had built their properties at the same time, or 
the network business had foreseen the arrival of the second 
customer, the cheaper network solution would have gone ahead. 
There is no perfect solution to these challenges, so balanced 
judgement and flexibility will be necessary.   
59 Nous Group (2010) 
60 Dyer (2009). Prices have been adjusted for inflation. 
6.1.2 …for consumers who are already connected to the 
network 
There is a high cost per consumer to build, maintain and operate 
the network in remote and regional areas. These are the first 
consumers for whom leaving the grid will be financially favourable 
as distributed generation costs fall. Yet because urban consumers 
subsidise the connection costs of regional and remote consumers, 
the latter groups will not face the price signals that will encourage 
them to make the lowest-cost decision. 
Spreading the cost of grid connection for people in rural and 
remote areas across the whole community has been a political 
choice to avoid being seen to disadvantage people in regional and 
remote Australia. Under Queensland’s Uniform Tariff Policy, for 
example, retail electricity prices in regional areas reflect the costs 
of supplying similar customers in the south east of the state, even 
though actual supply costs are higher in regional areas. A state 
government subsidy covers the extra costs incurred by the 
network business, Ergon Energy.  
Consumers can only make the most cost-effective decision 
between a network and distributed generation solution when 
faced with the real cost of the alternatives. This is not the case 
under a policy like the Uniform Tariff Policy. Yet, removing these 
locational subsidies is likely to be politically difficult. 
The practical solution is probably to recognise that only the local 
network business can make a reasonable assessment of the best 
alternative. The challenge is to ensure that any government 
subsidy does not prevent delivery of lowest-cost solutions.  
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6.1.3 …for edge-of-grid communities 
In some cases the cost of connecting a community to the grid or 
maintaining that grid connection is far greater than creating an 
islanded network. An islanded network has its own generation and 
network that operates independently from the rest of the grid or 
maintains a thin connection to it. 
Such a network is most likely to be relevant to communities on the 
fringe of the grid. Some will be in remote areas, others will be 
semi-urban. New developments at the fringes of cities and towns 
and without existing grid connection may also benefit from an 
islanded network.  
Yet maintaining a connection to the main grid has benefits. Firstly 
the main grid can act as a back-up to the islanded network. In 
extreme situations, where generation cannot meet demand, the 
community could purchase electricity from the main grid, using it 
as if it were a back-up generator. Conversely, any excess 
electricity the islanded network generates can be sold into the 
main grid.  
Anecdotal evidence suggests there are already areas where high 
costs to maintain the main grid would make an islanded network 
appropriate. If faced with the decision to connect these 
communities or individuals to the main grid now, distributed 
generation would be a cost-effective alternative, as Box 7 shows. 
There will be more of these opportunities as distributed generation 
costs fall and the technology improves. 
Box 7: When disconnecting makes sense 
In the north west of New South Wales, 263 customers are 
serviced by more than 1800 kilometres of network line: almost 
seven kilometres of line per customer. Even if these lines were 
the only infrastructure that had to be built to supply electricity to 
these customers — and there are other costs — the cost would 
be $91 million, or more than $346,000 per customer.61  
Instead, it would be cheaper for the network to provide each with 
a distributed generation option. The cost over the same period 
would be about $80,000 per customer. When the network needs 
to be replaced, this will most likely be the best option. Ensuring 
that network businesses adopt the RIT-D process for replacement 
capital spend will require the businesses to consider distributed 
generation for scenarios such as this. 
In order to deliver an islanded network under the current structure, 
a set of complex commercial arrangements is required between 
generation, retail and network businesses to capture the benefits. 
But there is little incentive for these businesses to do so. The 
alternative is an integrated approach with a single organisation 
responsible for generation, networks and retail — in other words, 
a return to the old model of electricity supply.  
61 Ibid. Prices have been adjusted for inflation. 
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6.2 Back to the future: recreating a traditional power 
company? 
Islanded networks create an opportunity to provide competition in 
the delivery of the whole electricity service, from generator to 
user. While network businesses are in a good position to deliver 
these services, regulations permitting, they are by no means the 
only option. Another business or third party could offer to supply 
these services to the consumer or community. 
Yet there are barriers to providing competition among alternatives 
in these circumstances. This section focuses on three issues: the 
current ring-fencing arrangements, a process to introduce 
competition and how electricity from the existing grid should be 
paid for. Other issues include whether consumer protections 
should stay the same in an islanded network. Governments, 
network businesses and other stakeholders need to consider 
these questions now, before islanded networks become viable but 
cannot be introduced because of poor incentives or regulations. 
6.2.1 Ring-fencing arrangements 
Network businesses will be well placed to provide islanded 
networks when they are the best solution. Yet both national and 
state regulations have ring-fencing arrangements that restrict the 
activities these businesses can undertake. They make innovations 
such as islanded networks difficult, and should be reformed. 
In South Australia, a distribution business cannot also hold a retail 
or a generation licence, unless the generation is used to support 
the network by dealing with a network constraint (see Chapter 5). 
Similar provisions exist in other states. In Victoria, networks are 
limited to installing generation with a capacity of up to 30 
megawatts to provide network support.  
Western Power, the government-owned network business that 
covers Perth and the south-west of Western Australia, has the 
same constraint. Western Power wants to undertake a trial to 
assess whether, when an islanded network opportunity exists 
within its network. As Western Power is prevented from delivering 
such a solution, it is investigating whether the islanded network 
could be supplied by Horizon Power, also government-owned, but 
without the same licence constraints. This is because Horizon 
Power is an integrated supplier in order to supply electricity to its 
consumers in regional and remote areas of the state.  
These regulations can also hinder networks from maximising the 
value of distributed generation. Because they are prevented from 
trading in the NEM, they cannot sell electricity from distributed 
generation on the spot market. As an alternative, the distribution 
business can make a commercial arrangement with a retailer to 
purchase the electricity from them, but the network will not get the 
most value from this arrangement.  
If a network business was allowed to trade in the NEM, a network 
business using a generator or battery could sell electricity on the 
wholesale spot market during periods when prices are high, 
generating a revenue stream from its distributed generation. 
Increased revenue will make the business case for distributed 
generation more attractive. 
At present, a network business could set up its own ring-fenced 
business away from its other operations to generate, buy and sell 
electricity in the NEM. Yet this will create an additional cost and 
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administrative burden on a network business to deliver a solution 
that is supposed to save money, and network businesses may 
choose not to go down this path.  
It is expected that the AER will be required to develop and publish 
ring-fencing guidelines by July 2016. As part of this process the 
AER should review current ring-fencing arrangements to 
determine whether they present barriers to these alternatives. If 
they do, the rules should be changed to remove the barriers. 
6.2.2 Competition in delivery of islanded networks 
At present, consumers in remote communities have limited 
options for electricity supply. Distributed generation will give them 
a genuine alternative to grid-supplied electricity. Competition can 
make sure the solution is delivered at least cost. 
The size of an islanded network creates little scope for 
competition for either generation or retail services. Because a 
community’s needs would require only a limited number of 
generators, which would need to be in place at the time an 
islanded network was created, the opportunity for entry into the 
market would be limited. 
Retail competition would also be difficult. Costs for the islanded 
network would be isolated and it is unlikely that different prices 
could be charged to customers within the network. The lack of 
competition may also lead to customers facing higher prices than 
they otherwise would. 
A solution would be to allow any business to tender for the right to 
provide a fully integrated system of generation, network and retail 
services for a fixed term. The tender would have to determine the 
customers’ electricity price to prevent the franchise owner exerting 
monopoly power. 
Policy makers have much to resolve. Which communities are 
appropriate for an islanded network? Who should run the tender? 
How can consumer protections in an islanded network be 
maintained? Governments should initiate a process to consider 
how a competitive tender would work. 
6.2.3 Paying for the existing grid 
Islanded networks that wish to retain a shallow connection to the 
main grid to back up their islanded generation will still need to 
contribute to the main grid. Although they may use the main grid 
rarely or not at all, the connection will need to either be built or 
maintained. 
Prices for connection to the main grid need to be carefully 
considered. Consumers in the islanded network should not be 
required to pay for more network services than they use. At the 
same time, consumers on the main grid should not cross-
subsidise the islanded network’s connection. 
The introduction of a rates-based system, set out in Chapter 4, to 
pay for the main grid regardless of use would help to alleviate the 
problem. Consumers in the islanded network would pay a flat, 
yearly rate for the main grid infrastructure.  
If the islanded network needed to purchase electricity in an 
emergency, it should carry a premium price to allow for the 
islanded network’s lack of contribution to the costs of running the 
Grattan Institute 2015 49 
Sundown, sunrise 
main grid. Alternatively, the islanded network could pay a higher 
fixed rate to contribute to the running of the main grid, reducing 
the risk of price shocks should it ever need to access electricity 
from the main grid. 
Governments, regulators and industry participants need to start 
thinking about how to put the right processes in place now. 
Without them there is the risk that consumers will pay more for 
their electricity services than they need to. Alternatively, they will 
take matters into their hands and leave the network before 
governments and network businesses act. This would leave 
network businesses struggling to recover the costs of the existing 
grid — the real death spiral.
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7 What governments should do 
Governments’ support for the development of solar PV technology 
was poorly considered and implemented. With advances in 
battery technology, governments will again face the challenges of 
distributed generation. This chapter summarises 
recommendations that will help distributed generation contribute 
to a fairer, cheaper and low-emissions electricity sector. 
7.1 Get pricing right 
A clear timetable, no later than 2020, should be set for the 
mandatory introduction of demand-based tariffs across Australia. 
A roll-out of advanced meters — either smart or interval meters — 
to all consumers will need to be completed by the time demand-
based tariffs become mandatory. 
Other changes to the pricing structure, including critical peak 
pricing and more cost-reflective feed-in tariffs, should also be 
introduced. They will provide consumers with more targeted price 
signals in places and at times when the network is under stress. 
Responses to these signals by all consumers, but particularly 
those with distributed generation, can help prevent increased 
spending on network infrastructure.  
7.2 Develop an approach to dealing with redundant assets 
It is likely that developments in distributed generation and storage 
will result in under-utilisation of existing electricity network assets. 
In conjunction with all stakeholders, governments need to develop 
an answer to how these assets should be addressed, including 
who should pay for redundant assets and under what 
arrangements. 
7.3 Get the right network regulations in place 
Changes need to be made to the regulations to ensure network 
businesses deliver the lowest-cost solutions in all circumstances.  
Require network business to undertake an investment test 
for all replacement spending over $5 million 
Network businesses are having to spend more to replace 
infrastructure, yet they are not required to consider non-network 
alternatives. Adopting the RIT-D investment test for replacement 
spending will encourage networks to take up distributed 
generation solutions. 
Introduce annual adjustments of consumption and peak 
demand forecasts 
Forecasts of electricity consumption and peak demand determine 
how much capital network businesses invest in. These forecasts 
have been highly unreliable in recent years. To prevent this, the 
AER should be required to work with the businesses to adjust 
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forward capital plans on a yearly basis based on up-to-date 
forecasts.  
Formalise asset write-downs in the regulatory framework 
The regulations should allow the AER to disallow any 
infrastructure spending from the RAB by the amount of all capital 
spending that fails a prudent-investment test.   
7.4 Remove barriers to delivering off-grid solutions 
A range of barriers needs to be overcome for this future to be 
realised. There is as yet no formal competitive process by which a 
community can become an islanded network. Ring-fencing 
arrangements prevent network businesses from providing 
combined generation and network services. How an islanded 
network would pay for its connection to the grid, and how 
consumers in an islanded network would maintain their consumer 
protections, are difficult questions. Policy makers need to start 
work to answer them.  
In the first instance the AER should review the ring-fencing 
arrangements to determine the extent to which they will act as a 
barrier to adoption of distributed generation. Governments should 
develop a competitive tender process in the delivery of an 
islanded network. 
7.5 Conclusion: here comes the sun 
Battery storage is coming. Society has paid more for solar PV 
than it should have. We should not make the same mistake with 
battery storage. Nor should it be prevented from forming an 
integral part of our electricity system.  
In the past, policy makers failed to properly address the 
challenges of distributed generation. Early adopters of solar PV 
understandably took advantage of the policy failure. But all 
consumers paid a high price. The rise of battery storage presents 
a new challenge. If we get it right this time, solar power in 
Australia will finally find its place in the sun.  
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Appendix A Economics of solar PV, extended results
Sydney 
Figure 20: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, current tariff, Sydney 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 




Figure 21: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, demand tariff, Sydney 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
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Melbourne 
Figure 22: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, current tariff, Melbourne 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 




Figure 23: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, demand tariff, Melbourne 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
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Brisbane 
Figure 24: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, current tariff, Brisbane 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 




Figure 25: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, demand tariff, Brisbane 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
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Adelaide 
Figure 26: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, current tariff, Adelaide 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 




Figure 27: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, demand tariff, Adelaide 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
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Perth 
Figure 28: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, current tariff, Perth 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 




Figure 29: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, demand tariff, Perth 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
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Hobart 
Figure 30: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, current tariff, Hobart 
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 




Figure 31: Net present benefits and costs of a three-kilowatt solar 
PV system, demand tariff, Hobart  
Source: Grattan analysis of Victorian Government (2014), AEMO (2015a), BOM (2015), 
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